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SUBSIDIARITY IN REGIONAL
INTEGRATION REGIMES IN LATIN
AMERICA AND AFRICA
ANDREAS VON STADEN*
I
INTRODUCTION
The principle of subsidiarity features prominently in discussions concerning
the allocation and exercise of political and legal authority in multilevel
governance arrangements in which at least some competences are shared
between different levels of politico–legal decisionmaking—so much so that
1
some have heralded, at least in Europe, an emerging “age of subsidiarity.”
2
Understood as signifying a “rebuttable presumption for the local,” or favoring
lower levels of political organization and decisionmaking more generally, much
of the legal and political science literature on the topic takes its principal
theoretical and empirical cues from the experience with subsidiarity and its
cognates in European institutional contexts. In the European Union (EU),
3
subsidiarity made its first appearance in the 1992 Treaty of Maastricht and is
4
currently codified in Article 5(3) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU); an
additional protocol provides national parliaments with monitoring rights as to
5
the EU’s compliance with the principle. In the context of the European
6
Convention of Human Rights (ECHR), subsidiarity considerations have
figured in particular as part of the “margin of appreciation” doctrine, which
grants respondent states some freedom of choice in how they interpret and
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1. See, e.g., Robert Spano, Universality or Diversity of Human Rights? Strasbourg in the Age of
Subsidiarity, 14 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 487, 491 (2014).
2. Andreas Føllesdal, Subsidiarity and International Human-Rights Courts: Respecting SelfGovernance and Protecting Human Rights—Or Neither?, 79 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 2, 2016, at
147, 148.
3. Treaty on European Union arts. B & G (5), Feb. 7, 1992, 1992 O.J. (C 191) 1, 6 (introducing
new article 3(b) on the subsidiarity principle into the Treaty Establishing the European Economic
Community).
4. See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union art. 5(3), 2012 O.J. (C 326) 13, 18
[hereinafter TEU].
5. See Protocol (No 2) on the Application of the Principles of Subsidiarity and Proportionality,
2010 O.J (C 83) 206.
6. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213
U.N.T.S. 221, E.T.S. no. 5 [hereinafter ECHR].
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7

apply Convention provisions domestically. Developed especially in the
jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), express
references to the margin of appreciation and subsidiarity as guides for the
Court’s supervisory practice will be added to the preamble of the ECHR once
8
Protocol No. 15 to the Convention enters into force.
Whereas the meaning and operation of subsidiarity in the European context
are fairly well investigated and understood, less is known about the principle’s
significance outside of Europe. Nothing about subsidiarity would prevent it
from being deployed in multilevel governance arrangements elsewhere, and
some authors have discussed the subsidiarity principle in terms of its general
9
applicability. Regarding specifically regional contexts, there is no dearth of
organizations in the Americas, Africa, or Asia—nor of organizations that cut
across regions and continents—that strive for greater economic and, less
frequently, political integration of their member states. In these organizations,
subsidiarity might have a role to play. Because the institutional designs of many
regional integration organizations have been inspired by the European model,
and because the question of the exercise of overlapping competences located at
different levels of politico–legal organization can arise in all multilevel
governance systems, one might expect that a fundamental principle that
addresses precisely this question and that has fruitfully been employed
elsewhere would be adopted as well.
This article investigates the presence or absence of subsidiarity in select
regional economic integration organizations—namely, the Southern Common
Market (Mercosur) and the Andean Community in Latin America, and also the
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the East African

7. See Herbert Petzold, The Convention and the Principle of Subsidiarity, in THE EUROPEAN
SYSTEM FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 41, 59 (Ronald St. J. Macdonald, Franz Matscher
& Herbert Petzold eds., 1993) (noting that the “margin of appreciation . . . stems directly from the
principle of subsidiarity as it applies within the Convention system”); Alastair Mowbray, Subsidiarity
and the European Convention on Human Rights, 15 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 313, 320–39 (2015) (tracing the
use of subsidiarity in the ECtHR’s jurisprudence); Dominic McGoldrick, A Defence of the Margin of
Appreciation and an Argument for Its Application by the Human Rights Committee, 65 INT’L & COMP.
L.Q. 21, 22–32 (2016) (examining justifications and critique for the Court’s deference based on the use
of the margin-of-appreciation doctrine).
8. See Protocol No. 15 Amending the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms art. 1, June 24, 2013, C.T.E.S. no. 213; see also Protocol No. 16 to the
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms pmbl. & art. 1, Oct. 2,
2013, C.T.E.S. no. 214 (establishing the right of the highest national courts to request ECtHR advisory
opinions in order to “reinforce implementation of the Convention, in accordance with the principle of
subsidiarity”); Føllesdal, supra note 2, at 153.
9. See, e.g., DEFERENCE IN INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS: STANDARD OF REVIEW
AND MARGIN OF APPRECIATION (Lukasz Gruszczynski & Wouter Werner eds., 2014); Andreas
Føllesdal, Subsidiarity as a Constitutional Principle in International Law, 2 GLOBAL
CONSTITUTIONALISM 37 (2013); Paolo G. Carozza, Subsidiarity as a Structural Principle of
International Human Rights Law, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 38 (2003); Yuval Shany, Toward a General Margin
of Appreciation Doctrine in International Law?, 16 EUR. J. INT’L L. 907 (2005); see also Jorge Contesse,
Contestation and Deference in the Inter-American Human Rights System, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.,
no. 2, 2016, at 123.
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Community (EAC), and the Southern African Development Community
(SADC) in Africa. Part II briefly restates the theoretical framework for this
investigation. Parts III and IV examine, at the level of formal legal instruments
and other official documents, the use and definition of subsidiarity in the
regional contexts under consideration. The final part concludes.
II
SUBSIDIARITY AND REGIONAL INTEGRATION REGIMES
10

As noted above, the basic thrust of the subsidiarity principle favors
governance at lower, more local levels. The functional role of the principle in
concrete governance arrangements beyond the state is to lay down the criteria
that, if met, rebut that presumption and authorize or justify the exercise of
authority at the regional or global level of organization. These criteria turn
subsidiarity into a conditional switch between levels of governance. In the case
of the EU, the implied criteria are effectiveness and efficiency: as stipulated by
Article 5(3) of the TEU, for the EU to exercise a nonexclusive competence, the
subsidiarity principle requires that the intended objective cannot be adequately
accomplished by the member states acting alone and “can rather, by reason of
11
the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved at Union level.”
Both the negative and the positive criteria must be met before the subsidiarity
principle points to the EU as the institution appropriate for regulation and
12
policymaking.
13
In other institutionally bounded contexts, different criteria have been
employed. The “complementarity principle,” operating at the admissibility
stage of cases brought before the International Criminal Court, also employs
the logic of subsidiarity by using a country’s inability or unwillingness to pursue
prosecutions domestically as the criteria for rebutting the presumption for the
14
local. Elsewhere, the “exhaustion of domestic remedies” requirement, a
standard admissibility requirement litigants must meet before the merits of
individual human rights complaints can be considered by judicial and quasi-

10. See Theodore Schilling, A New Dimension of Subsidiarity: Subsidiarity as a Rule and a
Principle, 14 YB. EUR. L. 203, 213–17 (1994) (using Ronald Dworkin’s distinction between rule and
principle to point out that subsidiarity as codified in the EU represents an instance of the former rather
than the latter, but that subsidiarity may also operate in a principle’s guiding, rather than a rule’s
outcome-determinative manner).
11. TEU, supra note 4, art. 5(3).
12. PHILIPP KIIVER, THE EARLY WARNING SYSTEM FOR THE PRINCIPLE OF SUBSIDIARITY:
CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY AND EMPIRICAL REALITY 70 (2012).
13. See Markus Jachtenfuchs & Nico Krisch, Subsidiarity in Global Governance, 79 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 2, 2016, at 1, 8–9 (distinguishing between the operation of subsidiarity in
unbounded versus institutionally bounded contexts).
14. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 17(1), July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S.
90 (stipulating that cases are inadmissible before the ICC except where a state involved with
jurisdiction over the charged crime(s) is “unwilling or unable” to investigate and prosecute itself); see
also id. arts. 17(2) & 17(3) (laying down criteria for determining unwillingness and inability).
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judicial dispute-settlement bodies beyond the state, expresses a sequential
version of subsidiarity. In the same issue area, the ECtHR’s “margin of
appreciation” foregrounds the epistemic advantages of national
16
17
decisionmakers, the greater democratic legitimacy of domestic procedures,
and the absence of a European policy of near-consensus as compelling, but still
18
rebuttable, reasons for deference.
In line with the demand and supply conjectures articulated in the
19
introduction to this issue, in the case of the regional organizations here under
consideration, one should expect the appearance of subsidiarity, or of a related
competence-selecting principle, to be conditioned by the following factors:
First, demand for subsidiarity should be higher the more the regional
arrangement creates an actual multilevel governance system that situates
consequential politico–legal decision-making power at the regional level and
20
whose nonexclusive competence overlaps with that of the member states.
Second, subsidiarity should more likely be demanded the more regional
decisionmaking is removed from state consent, that is, when consensus and
21
unanimity give way to majority voting—“pooled sovereignty” —or even to full
delegation of decision-making authority to a regional organ no longer directly
22
controlled by states. Third, the demand for subsidiarity should be positively
correlated with the intrusiveness and specificity of an organization’s or organ’s
23
output. Fourth, the more a regional integration regime deals preponderantly
with the regulation and management of (economic) externalities, the smaller
the probability that a subsidiarity principle will be supplied; by the same token,
as more internal matters are being regulated, the probability of its supply
24
should increase. Fifth, the preferences of powerful member states for
regulatory uniformity, and, sixth, preferences of well-entrenched regional

15. See, e.g., ECHR, supra note 6, art. 35(1) (“The Court may only deal with the matter after all
domestic remedies have been exhausted . . . .”); American Convention on Human Rights art. 46(1),
Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123; Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights art. 2, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
16. See ANDREW LEGG, THE MARGIN OF APPRECIATION IN INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
LAW: DEFERENCE AND PROPORTIONALITY 148–50 (2012).
17. See id. at 75–79; see also Andreas von Staden, The Democratic Legitimacy of Judicial Review
Beyond the State: Normative Subsidiarity and Judicial Standards of Review, 10 INT’L J. CONST. L. 1023,
1041–42 (2012).
18. KANSTANTSIN DZEHTSIAROU, EUROPEAN CONSENSUS AND THE LEGITIMACY OF THE
EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 132–42 (2015) (discussing the role of consensus in the width of
the margin of appreciation).
19. Jachtenfuchs & Krisch, supra note 13, at 14–17.
20. Id. at 14–15.
21. See generally Liesbet Hooghe & Gary Marks, Delegation and Pooling in International
Organizations, 10 REV. INT’L ORGS. 305, 307 (2015) (distinguishing delegation as a “conditional grant
of authority by member states to an independent body” from pooling, defined as “joint decision making
among the principals themselves”).
22. Jachtenfuchs & Krisch, supra note 13, at 15.
23. Id.
24. Id.
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bodies for securing or broadening their own authority should likewise be
expected to lower the probability of the provision of a formally articulated
25
subsidiarity principle.
Given these conjectures, the institutional contexts in which one should most
likely find references to subsidiarity are the regional regimes’ third-party
dispute-settlement arrangements. Regarding the question of overlapping
competences as the most obvious general context for the application of a
subsidiarity principle, assessments are complicated by the fact that few treaties
follow the EU’s example of expressly allocating competences in terms of
26
exclusiveness and nonexclusiveness. As a result, their exclusive or
nonexclusive character will usually have to be inferred from the governance
architecture as a whole and subsequent practice under the treaty in question.
Furthermore, although the demand for subsidiarity may be highest under
conditions of delegation and pooled sovereignty, it also retains some utility in
arrangements that preserve a national veto by requiring consensus or
unanimity. This is so because the exercise of that veto is generally in the hands
of the executive branch, which represents the state in international
organizations, and its exercise or nonexercise may not reflect the subsidiarity
concerns of other national stakeholders with competences at stake, such as
national parliaments. That said, executives generally have little incentive, unless
compelled, to press for the inclusion of subsidiarity principles that benefit other,
possibly rival, domestic institutions.
Subsidiarity may play different roles in the institutional design and
operation of regional organizations. When formally included in an
organization’s constitutive instrument, as in the case of the EU, subsidiarity
may be invoked to regulate, guide, or otherwise inform the choice of the level,
or site, of politico–legal decision-making competence that is to be exercised to
achieve a given objective. In this sense, then, subsidiarity primarily serves a
selection function. The absence of any mention of subsidiarity in the
organization’s legal or policy instruments, however, does not necessarily mean
that considerations of subsidiarity have been absent. Instead, subsidiarity
concerns may have already affected the decision as to which competences have
been delegated to the regional organization in the first place, which reveals an
allocation function. Though there may be contention over whether, in the
absence of express stipulation, the competences allocated to the regional
organization are exclusive or not, at least with respect to those decision-making
powers that have been left entirely at the national level one may safely infer
that the treaty drafters determined that the domestic level was the appropriate
one for achieving any objectives within the relevant policy domain. Last but not
least, irrespective of whether formally stipulated as an institutional principle or
not, considerations of subsidiarity may still inform the manner and modalities of
25. Id. at 16–17.
26. See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union arts. 2–6,
2012 O.J. (C326) 47, 50–53 [hereinafter TFEU].
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the exercise of both exclusive and nonexclusive competences of international
organizations. Whereas all three uses of the subsidiarity principle are important
and may be separately or jointly present, this article focuses only on the extent
to which subsidiarity is being articulated and employed as an express
competence-selecting principle in the regional organizations reviewed here.
III
SUBSIDIARITY IN LATIN AMERICAN REGIONAL INTEGRATION REGIMES
In addition to the intricate web of regional trade agreements, aptly captured
by the memorable metaphor of the “spaghetti bowl” of multiple and often
27
overlapping agreements, the Americas are home to a sizable number of formal
regional organizations that at least nominally pursue economic and political
integration. Indeed, since the late 1960s, “integration” is mentioned as a
programmatic goal in the continent-wide Charter of the Organization of
28
American States (OAS). With the exception of the OAS and a few subregional
organizations of which Mexico is a member, all of these are located in Latin
America, which is home to at least thirteen regional and subregional
29
organizations as of 2012. This part discusses two of the most prominent Latin
American regional integration organizations: Mercosur and the Andean
30
Community.
A. Mercosur
Mercosur was founded in 1991 by the Treaty of Asunción, concluded
31
between Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay. In 2012, Venezuela joined
27. See ANTONI ESTEVADEORDAL ET AL., BRIDGING REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS IN THE
AMERICAS viii–x (Inter-American Developmental Bank Special Report on Integration and Trade,
2009) (discussing the increase in regional trade agreements and the consequences of the “spaghetti
bowl’s” continued expansion).
28. See Charter of the Organization of American States (as amended) arts. 39(a), 41–44, 46 & 52,
http://www.oas.org/dil/treaties_A-41_Charter_of_the_Organization_of_American_States.pdf (outlining
how member states should cooperate to achieve, inter alia, regional integration). The original OAS
Charter did not include any express commitment to integration; see Charter of the OAS, Apr. 30, 1948,
119 U.N.T.S. 1609. The integration-related provisions were introduced by the Protocol of Amendment
to the Charter of the Organization of American States (“Protocol of Buenos Aires”) art. VIII, Feb. 27,
1967, http://www.oas.org/dil/treaties_B-31_Protocol_of_Buenos_Aires.htm, whose preamble expressed
the OAS member states’ commitment “to speed up the process of economic integration.” Id. pmbl.
29. Detlef Nolte, Latin America’s New Regional Architecture: A Cooperative or Segmented
Regional Governance Complex? 2 (European University Institute Working Paper RSCAS 2014/89,
Sept. 2014).
30. In 2008, aiming at integrating Mercosur and the Andean Community, their member states,
plus Chile, Guyana, and Suriname, signed the constitutive treaty of the Union of South American
Nations (UNASUR, in force since 2011), which may eventually displace the subregional organizations
but so far has not done so. See, e.g., José Briceño-Ruiz & Andrea Ribeiro Hoffmann, Post-Hegemonic
Regionalism, UNASUR, and the Reconfiguration of Regional Cooperation in South America, 40 CAN. J.
LATIN AM. & CARIBBEAN STUD. 48 (2015) (discussing the creation of UNASUR in the context of
Latin American regionalism).
31. Treaty Establishing a Common Market between the Argentine Republic, the Federal Republic
of Brazil, the Republic of Paraguay and the Eastern Republic of Uruguay, Mar. 26, 1991, 2140 U.N.T.S.
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as the fifth full member, and Bolivia is in the process of becoming the sixth.
The Treaty of Asunción expressed the objective of establishing a common
34
market by December 31, 1994, but it did not provide for any effective
mechanism in the Treaty’s mere twenty-four articles by which the laws and
policies necessary for its creation were to be put in place. Only two decisionmaking bodies, the Council of the Common Market and the Common Market
Group, were established, and both were composed of governmental
representatives from all member states—at the ministerial level in the Council
and lower ranks in the Common Market Group. Beyond some basic allocation
of responsibilities, “the final institutional structure of the administrative organs
of the common market, as well as the specific powers of each organ” were left
to be determined prior to the establishment of the common market, that is,
35
before December 31, 1994. This eventually occurred in the Protocol of Ouro
36
Preto. Despite institutional minimalism, remarkable initial progress was
achieved, with internal tariffs abolished for ninety percent of traded goods and
a uniform external tariff applied to eight-five percent of such goods by the end
37
of 1994. Since then, hampered by intervening economic crises, political
disagreements, political and economic imbalance among its members, and
failure to implement and comply with Mercosur rules domestically, further
38
progress has been less smooth. As a result, the customs union—a key step
39
toward a common market—remains imperfect, and intragroup trade as a
40
percentage of overall exports is less today than it was in the late 1990s.
No Mercosur treaty or protocol mentions subsidiarity as a guiding principle
41
for the exercise of competences within the organization. An apparent
257 [hereinafter Treaty of Asunción].
32. See Rafael A. Porrata-Doria, Jr., Mercosur at Twenty: From Adolescence to Adulthood?, 27
TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 1, 34–35 (2013) (discussing Venezuela’s accession to Mercosur).
33. See Graciela Rodriguez-Ferrand, Mercosur: Protocol for Accession of Bolivia Approved (Aug.
18,
2015),
http://www.loc.gov/law/foreign-news/article/mercosur-protocol-for-accession-of-boliviaapproved/ (last visited Apr. 7, 2016).
34. Treaty of Asunción, supra note 31, art. 1.
35. Id. art. 18.
36. Additional Protocol to the Treaty of Asunción on the Institutional Structure of Mercosur, Dec.
17, 1994, 2145 U.N.T.S. 298 [hereinafter Protocol of Ouro Preto].
37. Karsten Bechle, Kein Auslaufmodell: 20 Jahre Mercosur, GIGA FOCUS no. 3 at 3 (2011),
http://www.giga-hamburg.de/de/system/files/publications/gf_lateinamerika_1103.pdf.
38. See id. at 4–5 (addressing factors that have impeded further integration); see also Laura
Gómez-Mera, Obstacles to Regional Integration in Latin America and the Caribbean, in REGIONAL
INTEGRATION FIFTY YEARS AFTER THE TREATY OF ROME: THE EU, ASIA, AFRICA AND THE
AMERICAS 111 (Joaquín Roy & Roberto Domínguez eds., 2008) (discussing compliance and
implementation gaps in regional organizations in Latin America, including Mercosur).
39. Finn Laursen, Requirements for Regional Integration: A Comparative Perspective on the EU,
the Americas and East Asia, in COMPARATIVE REGIONAL INTEGRATION: EUROPE AND BEYOND 239,
250 (Finn Laursen ed., 2010).
40. UNITED NATIONS, UNCTAD HANDBOOK OF STATISTICS 2014 at 41 (2014).
41. See, e.g., Roberto D. Bloch, El Principio de Subsidiariedad en la Unión Europea y en el
Mercosur, in LA CONSTRUCCIÓN DEL MERCOSUR: LA EVOLUCIÓN DE UN NUEVO ACTOR EN LAS
RELACIONES INTERNACIONALES 137, 143 (2003) (noting the absence of subsidiarity in Mercosur’s
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explanation for this absence, in line with the first conjecture, is that Mercosur
has been designed as a purely intergovernmental organization and continues to
43
operate as such. Though the Protocol of Ouro Preto increased the number of
44
official Mercosur organs to six, three of these—the Joint Parliamentary
45
Commission, which later became the Mercosur Parliament; the Economic–
Social Consultative Forum; and the Administrative Secretariat—have
consultative and supportive functions, but no consequential decision-making
46
authority. The three bodies that do—the Council of the Common Market, the
Common Market Group, and the newly introduced Mercosur Trade
47
Commission—can issue legally binding decisions, resolutions, and directives.
Not only are all three composed of government representatives, but their
decisions also need to be adopted “by consensus and in the presence of all the
48
States Parties.” There is no majoritarian decisionmaking or “pooled
sovereignty,” and hence there is no genuine supranational authority in
49
Mercosur, nor do its constitutive instruments provide for any express
stipulation as to which of Mercosur’s broadly defined competences are
50
exclusive and which ones are shared with the member states. Each government
can veto decisions that it thinks should not be considered at the level of
Mercosur or with which it simply disagrees. Thus, there is no obvious demand
for subsidiarity, as each government retains full control over which decisions
should be made domestically versus at the regional level.
Rather than at the level of intergovernmental organs, subsidiarity might
instead surface as part of Mercosur dispute settlement. Annex III to the Treaty
51
52
of Asunción and the 1991 Protocol of Brasilia first implemented basic
elements of Mercosur third-party dispute settlement, which the 2002 Protocol of
53
Olivos replaced with a more elaborate system. The current system essentially

constitutive instruments); FELIX FUDERS, DIE WIRTSCHAFTSVERFASSUNG DES MERCOSUR 75, 587
(2008) (noting the absence in Mercosur of a subsidiarity principle).
42. See supra Part II.
43. See MARIANNE KLUMPP, SCHIEDSGERICHTSBARKEIT UND STÄNDIGES REVISIONSGERICHT
DES MERCOSUR 64–67 (2013); Santiago Deluca, La subsidiariedad y las competencias de la Unión
Europea y el Mercosur, 2 REVISTA LATINOAMERICA DE DERECHO, no. 4, 125, 144–47 (2005) (both
discussing intergovernmental nature of Mercosur and the absence of supranational elements); see also
Protocol of Ouro Preto, supra note 36, art. 2 (referring to Mercosur’s decision-making bodies as “intergovernmental organs”).
44. Protocol of Ouro Preto, supra note 36, art. 1.
45. Protocol on the Establishment of the Mercosur Parliament, Dec. 9, 2005, 2444 U.N.T.S. 172.
46. See Protocol of Ouro Preto, supra note 36, arts. 26, 29 & 32.
47. Id. arts. 9, 15 & 20.
48. Id. art. 37.
49. KLUMPP, supra note 43, at 70 (noting the lack of autonomy of Mercosur organs).
50. FUDERS, supra note 41, at 75, 587 (noting the imprecisely defined competences of Mercosur).
51. Treaty of Asunción, supra note 31, annex III.
52. Protocol of Brasilia for the Solution of Controversies, Dec. 17, 1991, 2145 U.N.T.S. 25.
53. Protocol for the Settlement of Disputes in Mercosur, Feb. 18, 2002, 42 I.L.M. 2 (2003)
[hereinafter Protocol of Olivos]. See generally Raúl Vinuesa, The Mercosur Settlement of Disputes
System, 5 L. & PRACT. OF INT’L CTS. & TRIB. 77, 83–87 (2006).
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35

follows the WTO model, rather than that of the EU, providing both for
arbitration before a three-member ad hoc tribunal if a dispute cannot be settled
through direct negotiations as well as for the possibility of requesting review of
54
an arbitral award’s legal arguments by a Permanent Review Tribunal (PRT).
The members of the ad hoc tribunals and the PRT are, as to be expected from
judicial bodies, formally independent. Unlike the other decision-making organs
within Mercosur, the ad hoc tribunals and the PRT are thus in a position to
impose, by way of judicial lawmaking through treaty interpretation, legal
55
obligations upon member states that these have not consensually agreed upon.
So far, however, subsidiarity has not played any role in Mercosur
jurisprudence. Indeed, the lack of jurisprudence so far is in part due to the fact
that Mercosur members remain free to take trade complaints to the WTO
56
dispute-settlement body instead of to Mercosur tribunals. As of early 2016, ten
arbitral awards had been issued under the rules of the Protocol of Brasilia, two
under the revised rules of the Protocol of Olivos, and six awards and three
57
advisory opinions by the PRT. No case mentions “subsidiarity,” the “margin of
appreciation,” or other related concepts.
At the same time, however, both the institutional design of the disputesettlement system and the practice of the arbitral tribunals can be interpreted to
imply considerations of subsidiarity. Institutionally, the absence of compulsory
jurisdiction of a permanent court and the apparent preference for ad hoc
arbitration, with its greater control over the appointment of arbitrators and
procedural issues, is indicative of a preference for maintaining greater control
over Mercosur dispute settlement by the member states and thus of subsidiarity
in its allocative function. In their jurisprudence, Mercosur tribunals have
emphasized the organization’s intergovernmental character and distinguished it
58
from the EU’s supranationality. They have, moreover, differed in spelling out
the concrete remedial obligations that follow from an adverse finding, leaving
the question of how to execute awards in some cases—and thus granting at least
59
some margin of appreciation—to the respondent states. In one award, the
Tribunal articulated what might be identified as a “factual” understanding of
subsidiarity when it noted that national authorities could regulate certain
matters as long as Mercosur had not done so; the Tribunal did not, however,
specify any normative criteria Mercosur would have to meet to preempt
54. Protocol of Olivos, supra note 53, arts. 6(1), 17(1) & 17(2). The parties can also decide to
submit their case directly to the PRT, which then has the same jurisdiction as the ad hoc tribunals. See
id. art. 23.
55. KLUMPP, supra note 43, at 68–69.
56. See Protocol of Olivos, supra note 53, art. 1(2).
57. See awards and advisory opinions at Sistema de Solución de Controversias, TRIBUNAL
PERMANENTE DE REVISIÓN, http://www.tprmercosur.org/es/sol_controversias.htm (last visited Apr. 7,
2016).
58. Uru. v. Arg., Arbitral Award of Sept. 6, 2006, para. 150, http://www.mercosur.int/msweb/portal
%20intermediario/es/controversias/arquivos/TPR_Tribunal%20AdHoc_Laudo%20Libre%20Circulaci
on_ES.pdf.
59. See KLUMPP, supra note 43, at 251–53.
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national regulation. In the absence of such criteria, this approach effectively
privileges one national actor, the executive, over other domestic actors, such as
the legislature; unlike the latter, the executive could use Mercosur to stave off
national regulation by other domestic actors. In short, although certain judicial
pronouncements might be interpreted in terms of the subsidiarity principle, no
related judicial doctrine has thus far been articulated by the Mercosur tribunals.
In conclusion, given the absence of genuine multilevel governance in
Mercosur, the continuing centrality of state consent due to the prevalence of
consensual decisionmaking, and an institutionally weak dispute-settlement
system, there has so far been little pressing need for a formal subsidiarity
principle, a finding that meets the expectations under the first three demand
61
conjectures previously articulated. Because Mercosur regulation remains
squarely focused on managing economic transactions and externalities—
Mercosur does not possess any competence in the field of human rights, for
example—the probability of the supply of a subsidiarity principle is low on that
62
account as well, in line with the fourth conjecture. If subsidiarity has played a
role within Mercosur, it has been with respect to allocating exclusive politico–
legal decision-making authority to—or, rather keeping it in—the hands of
national executives, reflecting “member states’ desire to achieve economic
63
integration through political cooperation rather than institutionalism.”
Implementation and enforcement of Mercosur norms and decisions likewise
64
remain the member states’ responsibility. The strong position of presidents in
Latin American political systems has made Mercosur and its further
development effectively subject to “member state presidential diplomacy,”
65
resulting in a “state of affairs . . . described as interpresidentialism.” When
actors other than the executive, including subnational actors such as the
constituent entities of federal states, have sought to exert influence on Mercosur
66
policymaking, this has happened through informal channels and procedures.
The actual impact of such informal attempts, however, always remains
conditional on the willingness of national executives to act according to them at
the level of Mercosur decisionmaking.

60. Brza. v. Arg., Arbitral Award of May 21, 2001, para. 110, http://www.mercosur.int/msweb/
portal%20intermediario/es/controversias/arquivos/IV%20LAUDO.pdf.
61. See supra Part II.
62. See id.
63. Cherie O'Neal Taylor, Dispute Resolution as a Catalyst for Economic Integration and an Agent
for Deepening Integration: NAFTA and Mercosur, 17 J. INT’L L. & BUS. 850, 867–68 (1996-97).
64. Ljiljana Biukovic, Dispute Resolution Mechanisms and Regional Trade Agreements: South
American and Caribbean Modalities, 14 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 255, 270–71 (2008).
65. Porrata-Doria, supra note 32, at 15–16.
66. See Marcelo de Almeidas Medeiros, Multi-Level Governance and the Problem of Balance
within Mercosur, in MERCOSUR: BETWEEN INTEGRATION AND DEMOCRACY 75, 75 (Francisco
Domínguez & Marcos Aurélio Guedes de Oliveira eds., 2004).
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B. Andean Community
The Andean Community (AC) was founded by the 1969 Cartagena
67
Agreement, known at the time as the Andean Pact, and currently has four
members: Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru. Institutionally enhanced
68
through subsequent protocols and decisions, it was fully overhauled and
69
70
received its present name in 1996; further reforms followed in 1997. The AC’s
declared objective is “balanced and harmonious development . . . through
71
economic and social integration and cooperation.”
That the AC has taken some institutional design cues from the European
Communities and later the EU accounts for a number of differences between
the AC and Mercosur. First, the current institutional setup that defines the
“Andean Integration System” is denser and more diversified, though not
72
necessarily more effective. It is composed of no less than ten main organs and
73
a number of additional entities. Second, the AC’s institutional setup contains
certain nominally supranational elements that are missing from Mercosur.
Although the AC’s Presidential Council, the Council of Foreign Affairs
74
Ministers, and the Commission are all intergovernmental in nature, the
75
General Secretariat, the AC’s executive body headed by a formally
76
independent General Secretary, is to be staffed with officials chosen primarily

67. Agreement on Andean Sub-Regional Integration, May 26, 1969, 8 I.L.M. 910 (1969).
68. See Treaty Creating the Andean Tribunal of Justice, May 28, 1979, 18 I.L.M. 1203 (1979);
Treaty Establishing the Andean Parliament, Oct. 25, 1979, 19 I.L.M. 269; Protocol of Cochabamba
Amending the Treaty Creating the Court of Justice of the Cartagena Agreement, May 28, 1996,
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/treaties/en/pcjca/trt_pcjca.pdf; Additional Protocol to the Treaty
Establishing the Andean Parliament, April 23, 1997, http://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/treaties
/en/pteap/trt_pteap.pdf; Instrument for the Creation of the Andean Presidential Council, May 23, 1990,
in Acta de Machu Picchu 7, http://intranet.comunidadandina.org/Documentos/Presidencial/CP_01.doc
(in Spanish).
69. Protocol of Amendment Establishing the Andean Community and the Andean Integration
System (Protocol of Trujillo), Mar. 10, 1996, http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/other_treaties/text.jsp?
file_id=224901.
70. Protocol of Sucre, June 25, 1997, http://www.sice.oas.org/trade/junac/Carta_Ag/sucre_e.asp.
See generally José Luís da Cruz Vilaça & José Manuel Sobrino Heredia, The European Union and the
Transformation of the Andean Pact into the Andean Community: From the Trujillo Protocol to the Sucre
Act, 3 EUR. FOR. AFF. REV. 13, 27–36 (1998). A consolidated version of the text of the Cartagena
Agreement is available at http://www.sice.oas.org/trade/JUNAC/Decisiones/dec563e.asp (last visited
Apr. 7, 2016) [hereinafter Cartagena Agreement (as amended)].
71. Cartagena Agreement (as amended), supra note 70, art. 1.
72. See Laurence R. Helfer, Karen J. Alter & Florencia Guerzovich, Islands of Effective
International Adjudication: Constructing an Intellectual Property Rule of Law in the Andean
Community, 103 AM. J. INT’L L. 1, 1, 1 n. 3 (2009) (noting that “most commentators have ignored the
Andean Community or dismissed it as a failure”).
73. Cartagena Agreement (as amended), supra note 70, art. 6.
74. Id. arts. 11 (Andean Presidential Council), 15 (Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs), 21
(Commission of the Andean Community).
75. Id. art. 29.
76. Id. art. 32 (“During his term in office, the General Secretary shall not be able to carry out any
other activity; nor will he seek or accept instructions from any government, national entity or
international body.”).
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77

for merit, and its purpose is to “act[] solely in accordance with the interests of
78
the sub-region.” Not only are these aspects important to the Secretariat’s
competence of initiating Community legislation, which is shared with the
member states, but the Secretariat can also issue binding resolutions that
79
become part of the “legal system of the Cartagena Agreement.” Another
supranational element is the Commission’s power to adopt the principal
legislative instrument, known as Decisions, by absolute majority, or, with
respect to a list of enumerated issues, by absolute majority so long as no
negative vote is cast. By contrast, Decisions by the Council of Foreign Affairs
80
Ministers, which are also part of AC law, require consensus. Third, AC law,
like EU law, formally enjoys both supremacy over national law and direct effect
within national legal orders. Owing to a lack of agreement on these issues at the
time of the ratification of the original Andean Pact, legal stipulations to these
effects are found in the Treaty creating the Andean Court of Justice (ACJ)
81
rather than in the Cartagena Agreement.
The creation of a supranational multilevel governance arrangement with
82
pooled sovereignty should, per conjectures one and two, increase the
likelihood of the inclusion of a competence-selecting principle such as
subsidiarity. Yet despite the otherwise liberal borrowing of institutional
elements from the European model and the fact that major institutional reforms
were implemented after subsidiarity had made its formal appearance in the
1992 Maastricht Treaty, the principle is not explicitly mentioned in any of the
83
AC’s constitutive legal instruments. Although a detailed academic proposal to
amend the existing treaties to include subsidiarity as a competence-selecting
84
principle within the AC has surfaced, at the political level there has been little
meaningful debate about the desirability of adopting a subsidiarity principle
85
and no initiative to introduce it. The likely explanation for this absence, in line
77. Id. arts. 35 (Directors-General) & 37 (technical and administrative staff).
78. Id. art. 29.
79. ACJ Treaty (as amended), supra note 68, arts. 1(d) & 4.
80. Cartagena Agreement (as amended), supra note 70, arts. 17 & 26.
81. Decisions by the Andean Council of Foreign Ministers or of the Commission and Resolutions
of the General Secretariat shall be directly applicable in Member Countries. ACJ Treaty (as amended),
supra note 68, art. 3. Member states are obliged to comply “with the provisions comprising the legal
system of the Andean Community” and must “refrain from adopting or employing any such measure as
may be contrary to those provisions or that may in any way restrict their application.” Id. art. 4
(echoing a similar provision in EU law, which is now codified in the TEU, supra note 4, art. 4 (3)).
Citing to CJEU jurisprudence, the ACJ affirmed the supremacy and direct effect of AC law in its first
judgments. See Helfer, Alter & Guerzovich, supra note 72, at 16 n.76.
82. See supra Part II.
83. Marvin Vargas Alfaro, Los Principios Generales del Derecho Comunitario y Andino, REVISTA
DE DERECHO COMUNITARIO, INTERNACIONAL Y DERECHOS HUMANOS no. 2 at sec. E.1 (2012),
http://www.derechocomunitario.ucr.ac.cr/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=200%3Ap
rincipios-generales-derecho-comunitario-andino-vargas-alfaro&Itemid=4 (noting the absence of
subsidiarity in AC legal instruments).
84. DANIEL ACHÁ, EL PRINCIPIO DE SUBSIDIARIEDAD: CLAVE JURÍDICA DE LA INTEGRACIÓN
113–16 (2013).
85. Id. at 13.
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86

with conjecture four, is the primarily externality-regulating nature of the AC
in the area of economic transactions—like Mercosur, the AC does not have any
competence in the area of human rights—which may be seen as arguing against
providing member states with greater regulatory and policy freedoms.
Nor is there a general subsidiarity principle to be found in the ACJ’s
jurisprudence. To the contrary, under the ACJ’s complemento indispensable
principle, member states may enact domestic legislation in areas governed by
AC law only to the extent that these measures serve the implementation of, and
87
do not conflict with, AC norms. Elsewhere, however, the Court has taken a
more measured approach. For example, in one decision, the ACJ noted that
issue areas falling within the Community’s competence also remain “within the
competence of the national legislator for an indefinite [sic] time until they are
88
effectively covered by the Community norms.” In another decision, the ACJ
“coupled its recognition of shared legislative authority with deference to state
89
actors to determine the boundaries between Andean and national authority”
and it has generally refrained from directing domestic courts to apply its
responses from preliminary ruling requests to the facts of the case, despite
90
having authority to do so under the 1996 Cochabamba Protocol. Overall, it
appears that the ACJ’s approach to the relationship between member states
and AC institutions as they exercise competences comprises a mix of
considerations that cannot yet be condensed into a straightforward judicial
subsidiarity doctrine.
In sum, although the formal institutional design of the Andean Community
ostensibly makes it a much more likely candidate than Mercosur for the
adoption and operation of subsidiarity, so far no such principle has been
articulated either at the level of the AC’s constitutive legal instruments or in the
ACJ’s jurisprudence.
IV
SUBSIDIARITY IN AFRICAN REGIONAL INTEGRATION REGIMES
In addition to the African Union (AU) and its precursor, the Organization
of African Unity, there have been at least nineteen attempts to create new or
reforming and strengthening existing organizational schemes for the economic
or political integration of subregional groups of African states in the post–
91
World War II era. Moreover, in 1991, the Organization of African Unity
86. See supra Part II.
87. See, e.g., ACJ, Ruling 15-IP-2014, paras. 45–46 (Apr. 30, 2014); Karen J. Alter & Laurence R.
Helfer, Legal Integration in the Andes: Law-Making by the Andean Tribunal of Justice, 17 EUR. L. J.
701, 711 (2011) [hereinafter Legal Integration in the Andes]; Karen J. Alter & Laurence R. Helfer,
Nature or Nurture? Judicial Lawmaking in the European Court of Justice and the Andean Tribunal of
Justice, 64 INT’L. ORG. 563, 571 (2010). I thank Larry Helfer for pointing out this doctrine to me.
88. Legal Integration in the Andes, supra note 87, at 712 (quoting ATJ, Ruling 2-IP-90, point 1).
89. Alter & Helfer, Legal Integration in the Andes, supra note 87, at 712.
90. Id.
91. WOLFF-CHRISTIAN PETERS, THE QUEST FOR AN AFRICAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY:
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proclaimed the creation of a continental African Economic Community (AEC),
which is to come about “through the co-ordination, harmonization and
92
progressive integration of the activities of regional economic communities.”
There are currently eight such “Regional Economic Communities” (RECs)
93
recognized by the AU as AEC building blocks, and many states belong to
94
more than one: the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa, the
Southern African Development Community (SADC), the Economic
Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the East African Community
(EAC), the Economic Community of Central African States, the Arab
Maghreb Union, the Community of Sahel-Saharan States, and the
95
Intergovernmental Agency for Development. Only the first four are currently
96
sufficiently effective to serve as reliable building blocks for the AEC. The
principle of subsidiarity has made a formal appearance in several RECs as well
as in documents outlining the relationship between the AU and RECs in
97
security matters.
REGIONAL INTEGRATION AND ITS ROLE IN ACHIEVING AFRICAN UNITY—THE CASE OF SADC 64–
66 (2010).
92. Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community art. 88(1), June 3, 1991, 30 I.L.M. 1241
(1991); see also Constitutive Act of the African Union art. 3, July 11, 2000, 2158 U.N.T.S. 33; Protocol
on Relations between the African Union and the Regional Economic Communities, July 3, 2007, https:/
/caast-net-plus.org/object/document/239/attach/AU-RECs-Protocol.pdf. Further pronouncements that
the “ultimate goal of the African Union is full political and economic integration leading to the United
States of Africa,” AU Doc. Assembly/AU/Dec. 90 (V) (July 4-5, 2005), have so far remained
aspirational.
93. See Assembly of the African Union, Decision on the Moratorium on the Recognition of
Regional Economic Communities (RECs), Doc. Assembly/AU/Dec.112 (vii) (July 1–2, 2006)
(suspension of recognition of further RECs beyond the eight already recognized). See generally
Richard Frimpong Oppong, The African Union, the African Economic Community and Africa’s
Regional Economic Communities: Untangling a Complex Web, 18 AFR. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 92 (2010).
94. JAMES T. GATHII, AFRICAN REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS AS LEGAL REGIMES 65–85
(2011); see also ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR AFRICA, ASSESSING REGIONAL INTEGRATION IN
AFRICA (ARIA V): TOWARD AN AFRICAN CONTINENTAL FREE TRADE AREA 78 (2012) (“Six
African countries are members of one REC, 26 are members of two RECs, 20 are members of three
RECs, and one country belongs to four RECs.”).
95. See generally GATHII, supra note 94, 143–242 (discussing key institutional elements and trade
liberalization policies of the eight recognized RECs, plus of the Community of Sahel-Saharan States).
96. See PETERS, supra note 91, at 105–07; RICHARD FRIMPONG OPPONG, LEGAL ASPECTS OF
ECONOMIC INTEGRATION IN AFRICA 11 n. 19 (2011) (noting that the other four RECs have
“witnessed very little progress in their economic integration process”).
97. See Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation in the Area of Peace and Security
between the African Union, the Regional Economic Communities, and the Coordinating Mechanisms
of the Regional Standby Brigades of Eastern Africa and Northern Africa art. IV (iv), June 2008,
http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/mou-au-rec-eng.pdf (affirming “adherence to the principles of
subsidiarity, complementarity and comparative advantage, in order to optimize the partnership
between the Union, the RECs and the Coordinating Mechanisms in the promotion and maintenance of
peace, security and stability”). However, the Memorandum also asserts “recognition of, and respect for,
the primary responsibility of the Union in the maintenance and promotion of peace, security and
stability in Africa, in accordance with Article 16 of the P[eace and] [S]ecurity C[ouncil] Protocol.” Id.
art. IV(ii). How these conflicting stipulations are to be reconciled remains unresolved. See AFRICAN
UNION, AFRICAN PEACE AND SECURITY ARCHITECTURE: 2010 ASSESSMENT STUDY 67 (2010)
(noting the lack of clarity as to the application of subsidiarity between the AU and the RECs in
practice).
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A. Economic Community of West African States
98

ECOWAS was founded in 1975. After failing to achieve its ambitious goal
of bringing about a customs union within fifteen years of its creation, the
99
organization was redesigned in 1993, and further changes were introduced by
100
subsequent protocols. The revised treaty set the even more demanding
objective of establishing an economic union that comprises a common market
101
and a monetary union within fifteen years. In its preamble, it furthermore
expressly recognizes that “integration of the Member States into a viable
regional Community may demand the partial and gradual pooling of national
sovereignties to the Community” and affirms the “need to establish Community
102
Institutions vested with relevant and adequate powers.”
The types and nomenclature of many of the organs of the current ECOWAS
governance architecture suggest that ECOWAS has begun to follow the
institutional blueprint of the EU and to move, at least in theory, toward
supranational governance. The two highest decision-making bodies, however,
remain intergovernmental. At the top, the so-called Authority of Heads of State
and Government is responsible for taking “all measures to ensure [the
103
Community’s] progressive development and the realisation of its objectives.”
Just below it, the Council of Ministers has certain decision-making powers of its
104
own, including those that derive from acts of delegation by the Authority.
105
There is an ECOWAS Parliament that is to be eventually directly elected by
the people of the member states and whose powers are foreseen to be
“progressively enhanced from advisory to co-decision making and subsequently
106
to law making in areas to be defined by the Authority.” Neither has occurred,
107
so the parliament remains limited to an advisory and consultative role. In
98. Treaty of the Economic Community of West African States, May 28, 1975, 14 I.L.M. 1200. The
ECOWAS members are Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau,
Ivory Coast, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo.
99. Revised Treaty of the Economic Community of West African States, July 24, 1993, 2373
U.N.T.S. 233 [hereinafter Treaty of Cotonou]. See generally KOFI OTENG KUFOUR, THE
INSTITUTIONAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE ECONOMIC COMMUNITY OF WEST AFRICAN STATES 35–
68 (2006) (discussing the 1993 revisions of the ECOWAS Treaty).
100. See Supplementary Protocol A/SP1/12/01Amending Articles 1, 3, 6, and 21 of the Revised
Treaty of the Economic Community of West African States, Dec. 21, 2001; Supplementary Protocol
A/SP.1/06/06 Amending the Revised ECOWAS Treaty, June 14, 2006 [hereinafter Suppl. Protocol of
Abuja]. The texts of the protocols are available at ECOWAS, LEGAL DOCUMENTS,
http://documentation.ecowas.int/legal-documents/protocols/.
101. Treaty of Cotonou, supra note 99, arts. 3(1), 3(2)(d) and (e) & 54(1).
102. Id. pmbl.
103. Id. art. 7(2).
104. Id. art. 10.
105. Id. art. 13; see also Protocol A/P.2/8/94 Relating to the Community Parliament, Aug. 6, 1994,
http://www.parl.ecowas.int/documents/protocols_eng.pdf.
106. Supplementary Protocol A/SP.3/06/06 Amending Protocol A/P.2/8/94 Relating to the
Community Parliament art. 4 (revising art. 6 (2)), June 14, 2006, http://www.parl.ecowas.int/documents
/protocols_eng.pdf.
107. See Parliament of the Economic Community of West African States, Strategic Plan of the
ECOWAS Parliament (Third Legislature) 2011–2015, ¶¶ 2 & 19–20, http://www.parl.ecowas.int/
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2006, the Executive Secretariat was transformed into the “ECOWAS
108
109
Commission,” now consisting of fifteen Commissioners, and was given the
competence to “formulate proposals that will enable the Authority and Council
to make decisions on the main orientations of policies of Member States and
110
the Community.” Lastly, the ECOWAS Community Court of Justice has been
111
operational since 2001, and its judgements are “binding on the Member
States, the Institutions of the Community and on individuals and corporate
112
bodies.” The 2006 reforms also clarified the supranational nature of the
various ECOWAS law-making instruments, again taking cues from the EU
113
model. All Community Acts are to be adopted either by unanimity,
114
consensus, or—and this is new—a two-thirds majority. Which standard will
apply to which types of decisions, however, is not specified.
The reforms have thus paved the ground for the introduction of
115
supranationality into the governance architecture of ECOWAS, which could
open up space for subsidiarity to operate. Though none of the treaties and
protocols explicitly mentions subsidiarity, the principle surfaces in a number of
116
Community documents, such as the ECOWAS Vision 2020, the 2007–2010
documents/Strategic_Plan_Final_Eng.pdf.
108. Suppl. Protocol of Abuja, supra note 100, arts. 1 & 2 (introducing new art. 17 into Treaty of
Cotonou).
109. Economic Community of West African States, Decision Expanding the Management Cadre of
the ECOWAS Commission and Increasing the Number of Commissioner Positions to Fifteen, Feb. 28,
2013, ECOWAS Doc. A/DEC.4/02/13, http://documentation.ecowas.int/download/en/legal_documents
/regulations/acts/15%20Commissioners.pdf.
110. See Suppl. Protocol of Abuja, supra note 100, art. 2 (introducing new Article 19(5) into Treaty
of Cotonou).
111. Karen J. Alter, Laurence R. Helfer & Jacqueline McAlister, A New International Human
Rights Court for West Africa: The ECOWAS Community Court of Justice, 107 AM. J. INT’L L. 737, 748
(2013).
112. Treaty of Cotonou, supra note 99, art. 15(4).
113. The Authority’s Supplementary Acts are binding and have direct effect in member states.
Council Regulations have the same effects; whereas directives are binding only with respect to their
objectives, Council decisions are binding for those to whom they are addressed. The ECOWAS
Commission “may adopt Rules relating to the execution of Acts enacted by the Council of Ministers,”
and these “[r]ules . . . shall have the same legal force as Acts adopted by Council for the execution of
which the Rules are adopted.” See Suppl. Protocol of Abuja, supra note 100, art. 2 (introducing new art.
9 into Treaty of Cotonou). Compare this with the provision on the EU’s secondary legislation in TFEU,
supra note 26, art. 288.
114. Suppl. Protocol of Abuja, supra note 100, art. 2 (introducing new art. 9(8) into Treaty of
Cotonou).
115. Currently most of the supranational potential of these reforms continues to exist more in
theory than in practice, and decisionmaking remains centered in the Authority; see STEFAN PLENK,
REGIONALE INTEGRATION IM SUB-SAHARISCHEN AFRIKA: EINE ANALYSE VON EAC, SADC UND
ECOWAS 399, 418 (2015) (noting that the supranational potential of ECOWAS institutions remains
largely theoretical); Jadesola O. Lokulo-Sodipe & Abiodun J. Osuntogun, The Quest for a
Supranational Entity in West Africa: Can the Economic Community of West African States Attain the
Status?, 16 POTCHEFSTROOM ELECTR. L. J. 255, 278, 282 (2013); Chidebe M. Nwankwo, Jr.,
Legitimation of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS): A Normative and
Institutional Inquiry 225–26 (June 2014) (unpublished PhD dissertation, Brunel University),
http://bura.brunel.ac.uk/bitstream/2438/9387/1/FulltextThesis.pdf.
116. ECOWAS Vision 2020: Toward a Democratic and Prosperous Community 7 (June 2010)

2-VON STADEN INCORPORATED (DO NOT DELETE)

No. 2 2016]

5/17/2016 5:45 PM

SUBSIDIARITY IN REGIONAL INTEGRATION REGIMES
117

43
118

Strategic Plan, and some other policy documents and reports. In most of
these, subsidiarity is mentioned simply as a presumptive ECOWAS principle
without further elaboration as to any criteria according to which it should
operate. One document defines subsidiarity as “intended to identify all
stakeholders with specific competencies and comparative advantages in their
operational areas and assign them tasks relating to their specialised fields of
119
endeavour.” While this “comparative advantage” notion might function as a
suitable criterion for switching between competences, this definition, applying
to “all stakeholders,” no longer necessarily revolves around different levels of
politico–legal authority and is linked to policy implementation, not
120
policymaking. Subsidiarity is also mentioned in the legally binding 2008
121
Supplementary Act on Environmental Policy. The Act describes subsidiarity
as a “guiding principle” according to which the “Community shall only deal
with, at the regional level, matters that cannot be better treated at the national
or local level. It is accepted that national competence shall be the rule, and
122
Community competence the exception.”
While the Act expresses
subsidiarity’s presumption for the local, it adopts a quite indeterminate
criterion—“better treated”—for determining whether the appropriate level of
governance is national or supranational. Subsidiarity continues to be invoked
occasionally in political statements, but again without specification of the
specific conditions under which ECOWAS, rather than the member states,
123
should act.
The ECOWAS Court of Justice should be a most likely candidate for the
application of the subsidiarity principle, especially because it has been given
124
formal jurisdiction to adjudicate human rights complaints. Surprisingly,
however, the Court’s human rights jurisdiction comes without the most

http://www.ecowas.int/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/ECOWAS-VISION-2020.pdf.
117. ECOWAS Strategic Plan 2007-2010 at 24, 25, 53 (May 2007) (on file with author). The 20112015 version, however, no longer mentions subsidiarity; see ECOWAS Regional Strategic Plan 20112015 (Sept. 2010), http://www.spu.ecowas.int/wp-content/uploads/2010/06/REGIONAL-STRATEGICPLAN-RFV-in-English.pdf.
118. See, e.g., ECOWAS Renewable Energy Policy 23 & 41 (2015), http://www.ecreee.org/sites/
default/files/documents/ecowas_renewable_energy_policy.pdf.
119. ECOWAS Draft Community Development Programme 92 (Dec. 2012), http://events.ecowas
.int/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/CDP-Doc_Draft1_EN_Translated_070313.pdf.
120. Id. at 184.
121. ECOWAS, Supplementary Act A/SA.4/12/08 Relating to the ECOWAS Environmental Policy
art. 7 (1)(a) (Dec. 19, 2008), http://www.ecowas.us/files/ecowas_environment_policy.pdf.
122. Id.
123. See, e.g., Final Communiqué of High Level Coordination Meeting of ECOWAS Partners on
the Fight against Ebola Virus Disease, press release 009/2015 para. 7 (Jan. 16, 2015),
http://news.ecowas.int/presseshow.php?nb=009&lang=en&annee=2015 (stressing respect, inter alia, for
principle of subsidiarity “as guiding principle for effective coordination among stakeholders” in the
Ebola crisis).
124. Supplementary Protocol A/SP.1/01/05 Amending Protocol A/P.1/7/91 Relating to the
Community Court of Justice art. 4, Jan. 19, 2005, http://www.courtecowas.org/site2012/
pdf_files/supplementaryprotocol.pdf.
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common subsidiarity criterion in this context: the requirement to exhaust
domestic remedies before a case becomes admissible in an international
126
tribunal. The Court itself has repeatedly affirmed that the absence of this
requirement is not an unintended oversight, and it has refused to import the
exhaustion of local remedies into ECOWAS law as a generally recognized
127
principle in human rights litigation beyond the state, effectively turning itself
128
into a human rights court of first instance. An initiative in 2009 by The
129
Gambia to introduce an exhaustion requirement failed. On the other hand, in
a practice that protects domestic judicial authority, the Court refuses to
adjudicate cases that have already been decided by domestic courts in the
130
member states, reasoning that it is not an appellate court. This approach to
overlapping levels of competence thus yields mixed results, denying deference
in one respect and granting it in another.
This brief review suggests that subsidiarity has a potential role to play in
ECOWAS, but the manner in which it is being invoked and, less frequently,
defined, also reveals that it has not yet been subject to a systematic and
coherent articulation. This may be due, in part, to the fact that ECOWAS,
despite its potential for genuinely supranational governance architecture, in
practice still largely operates as an intergovernmental, rather than a
131
supranational, organization.
B. East African Community
132

The reestablished EAC, comprised of the founding members Uganda,
Kenya, and Tanzania, plus Rwanda and Burundi, ambitiously aims both at
economic integration in the form of a common market and a monetary union,
133
and at the eventual creation of a “political federation.” The EAC is currently
125. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
126. Id.
127. See generally Amos Enabulele, Sailing Against the Tide: Exhaustion of Domestic Remedies and
the ECOWAS Community Court of Justice, 56 J. AFR. L. 268 (2012) (analyzing the Court’s position on
the exhaustion of domestic remedies doctrine).
128. Solomon Ebobrah, Critical Issues in the Human Rights Mandate of the ECOWAS Court of
Justice, 54 J. AFR. L. 1, 9 (2010).
129. Karen J. Alter, James T. Gathii & Laurence R. Helfer, Backlash Against International Courts
in West, East and Southern Africa: Causes and Consequences 10 (iCourts Working Paper No. 21, Aug.
30, 2015).
130. See Ebobrah, supra note 128, 9–10, 15–16 (noting instances in which the ECCJ refused to hear
or to decide cases involving domestic judgments on the basis of the argument that it was not a court of
appeal).
131. See, e.g., id. at 12.
132. The first EAC had been created by the Treaty for East African Co-Operation, June 6, 1967, 6
I.L.M. 932, but collapsed again in 1977. See Domenico Mazzeo, The Experience of the East African
Community: Implications for the Theory and Practice of Regional Cooperation in Africa, in AFRICAN
REGIONAL ORGANIZATION 150 (Domenico Mazzeo ed., 1984).
133. Treaty Establishing the East African Community art. 5 (2), Nov. 30, 1999, 2144 U.N.T.S. 255.
The treaty has been amended in 2006 and 2007, the consolidated version of the text is available at
http://www.eac.int/sites/default/files/docs/treaty_eac_amended-2006_1999.pdf [hereinafter EAC Treaty
(as amended)].
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the only African regional organization that includes an express reference to the
principle of subsidiarity in its founding instrument as one of the “operational
principles” of the Community. According to the EAC Treaty, “the practical
achievement of the objectives of the Community” is to be governed by “the
principle of subsidiarity with emphasis on multi-level participation and the
134
involvement of a wide range of stake-holders in the process of integration.”
This formulation could still be read to imply the EU version of the principle,
with an additional emphasis on the participation of various stakeholders across
different levels. An article on interpreting the Treaty’s key terms, by contrast,
defines subsidiarity as a “principle which emphasises multilevel participation of
135
a wide range of participants in the process of economic integration.” In this
definition, participation by stakeholders across levels is made the defining
characteristic of the principle as it applies, expressis verbis, to economic
integration, but possibly not to political integration, at least when applying the
136
principle expressio unius est exclusio alterius.
This definitional incongruence aside, the governance architecture of the
EAC remains ultimately intergovernmental in character. There is an East
African Legislative Assembly (EALA) whose members are to be elected by
137
national parliaments and that makes decisions, including on legislative bills,
138
on the basis of simple majorities. However, its bills become “Acts of the
Community” only when subsequently “assented to” by the Summit of Heads of
139
140
whose decisions require consensus.
The intergovernmental,
State,
ministerial-level Council is the Community’s “policy organ,” which can initiate
141
and submit bills to the Assembly and, echoing again EU secondary legislation,
142
“make regulations, issue directives [and] take decisions” that “shall be binding
on the Partner States, on all organs and institutions of the Community other
than the Summit, the Court and the Assembly within their jurisdictions, and on
143
those to whom they may under this Treaty be addressed.” Although the
Council can make some decisions by simple majority, decisions to submit a bill
to the Assembly and recommendations on treaty amendments and protocols,
144
among others, require consensus. The EAC’s Secretariat has no policy134. EAC Treaty (as amended), supra note 133, art. 7(1)(d).
135. Id. art. 1(1) (emphasis added).
136. Under this interpretive principle, the express mentioning of one thing (for example, an
objective, beneficiary, or exception) is inferred to mean that other things that are not mentioned are
excluded; see BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 581 (6th ed. 1990).
137. EAC Treaty (as amended), supra note 133, art. 50.
138. Id. art. 58(1).
139. Id. art. 62(1).
140. Id. art. 12(3).
141. Compare TFEU, supra note 26, art. 288.
142. EAC Treaty (as amended), supra note 133, art. 14(3)(d).
143. Id. art. 16.
144. See id. art. 15(4) (“Subject to a protocol on decision-making, the decisions of the Council shall
be by consensus.”); see also Protocol on Decision-making by the Council of the EAC art. 2, Apr. 21,
2001, http://www.eac.int/legal/index.php?option=com_docman&task=doc_download&gid=173&Item
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making competence of its own. Notably, the legal status of the “Acts of the
Community,” in contrast to the Council’s decisions, is nowhere explicitly
addressed but might be inferred from the denotation of Council decisions as
“legislation,” and from the express stipulation of “precedence” of EAC law
146
147
over national law, which is unique among African RECs.
This leaves the East African Court of Justice (EACJ), operational since
2001, as a community actor with consequential normative powers not subject to
direct member-state control. The EAC Treaty gives the Court jurisdiction over
148
149
complaints brought by states, the EAC Secretary-General, and legal and
150
and it expressly notes that EACJ decisions on the
natural persons,
interpretation and application of the EAC Treaty shall have precedence over
151
decisions of national courts. While EACJ jurisdiction over human rights is
152
foreseen in the EAC Treaty, subject to a still-to-be adopted future protocol,
the Court construed an incidental human rights jurisdiction on the basis of the
153
EAC’s “fundamental” and “operational principles,” which encompass a
commitment to “good governance including . . . the recognition, promotion and
154
protection of human and peoples’ rights [. . .].” Notably, as in ECOWAS, the
EAC Treaty lacks an exhaustion of domestic remedies requirement. The
Court’s appellate division has affirmed in this respect that the exhaustion of
local remedies forms part of customary law but noted that “though the Court
could be flexible and purposeful in the interpretation of the principle of the
local remedy rule, it must be careful not to distort the express intent of the
155
EAC Treaty.”
Another EACJ decision—the Court’s very first one—triggered immediate
treaty amendments, motivated by the Court’s alleged failure to pay due
deference to the exercise of domestic authority. Less than three weeks after the
EACJ had issued an interim injunction in 2006 related to charges that the
id=47 (identifying the Council decisions that shall be made by consensus).
145. EAC Treaty (as amended), supra note 133, art. 71 (outlining functions of the EAC
Secretariat).
146. Id. art. 8(4). Despite this provision, in its early jurisprudence the East African Court of Justice
shied away from expressly declaring the supremacy of EAC law. See Anne Pieter van der Mei, Regional
Integration: The Contribution of the Court of Justice of the East African Community, 69 HEIDELBERG J.
INT’L L. 403, 421 (2009).
147. See OPPONG, supra note 96, at 312.
148. EAC Treaty (as amended), supra note 133, art. 28.
149. Id. art. 29(1).
150. Id. art. 30(1).
151. Id. art. 33(2).
152. Id. art. 27(2).
153. Ally Possi, Striking a Balance Between Community Norms and Human Rights: The Continuing
Struggle of the East African Court of Justice, 15 AFR. HUM. RTS. L.J. 192, 204–09 (2015) (analyzing the
Court’s jurisprudence on cases involving human rights aspects).
154. EAC Treaty (as amended), supra note 133, art. 6(d); see also id. art. 7(2) (including among the
EAC’s operational principles “the maintenance of universally accepted standards of human rights”).
155. Att’y Gen. of Rwanda v. Plaxeda Rugumba, EACJ App. Div., appeal no. 1 of 2012, at 15
(2015).
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Kenyan procedure for selecting EALA members infringed Article 50 of the
156
EAC Treaty, preventing the Kenyan delegates to the EALA from being
sworn in, the EAC Summit adopted several new amendments. The
amendments expanded opportunities for removing sitting EACJ judges,
resulted in the creation of the appellate division, and stipulated that
“jurisdiction to interpret [the Treaty] shall not include the application of any
such interpretation to jurisdiction conferred by the Treaty on organs of Partner
157
States.” Article 50, as a case in point, provides that the procedure for selecting
EALA members shall be determined by the National Assembly of each
158
member state. The member states thus “rectified” the EACJ’s failure to pay
deference as a matter of judicial policy by reasserting their exclusive jurisdiction
through treaty amendments.
C. The South African Development Community
159

In terms of governance architecture, the SADC, founded in 1992, is
essentially intergovernmental in character. The only nonjudicial organ whose
decisions are binding is the Summit of Heads of State or Government,
160
described as SADC’s “supreme policy-making institution.” The Organ on
161
162
Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation, the Council of Ministers, the
163
Sectoral and Cluster Ministerial Committees, and the Standing Committee of
164
Officials are all composed of members of the national executive branches, and
165
the general decision-making rule for all of them is consensus. The SADC
Secretariat and Executive Secretary have purely supportive and administrative

156. Henry Onoria, Botched-Up Elections, Treaty Amendments and Judicial Independence in the
East African Community, 54 J. AFR. L. 74, 77 (2010).
157. EAC Treaty (as amended), supra note 133, art. 27(1); see also id. art. 30(3) (“The Court shall
have no jurisdiction under this Article where an Act, regulation, directive, decision or action has been
reserved under this Treaty to an institution of a Partner State.”).
158. EAC Treaty (as amended), supra note 133, art. 50(1).
159. Treaty of the Southern African Development Community. Aug. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 120 (1993).
The fifteen members are Angola, Botswana, Democratic Republic of Congo, Lesotho, Madagascar,
Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, United Republic of
Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. The SADC emerged from the Southern African Development
Coordination Conference (SADCC), which was established in 1980; regarding the SADCC, see Peter
Meyns, The Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) and Regional
Cooperation in Southern Africa, in AFRICAN REGIONAL ORGANIZATION 196 (Domenico Mazzeo ed.,
1984). The SADC Treaty has since been amended on several occasions; for the current version see
Consolidated Text of the Treaty of the Southern African Development Community (as amended) (Oct.
21, 2015), available at http://www.sadc.int/documents-publications/show/4171 [hereinafter SADC
Treaty (as amended]).
160. SADC Treaty (as amended), supra note 159, arts. 10(1) & 10(9).
161. Id. art. 10A.
162. Id. art. 11.
163. Id. art. 12.
164. Id. art. 13.
165. Id. arts. 10(9), 10A(7), 11(6), 12(8), 13(7); see also id. art. 19 (stipulating consensus as SADC’s
general decision-making rule, unless otherwise noted).
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roles. The decisions of the SADC Tribunal, which was provided for in the
1992 Treaty but was effectively established only in 2005, are legally binding and
167
final. As noted below, however, the Tribunal has become inoperative as a
result of political backlash against its first controversial decision.
Subsidiarity is not mentioned in the SADC Treaty, but it became a
recognized principle in 2001 when the SADC heads of state and government
168
unanimously adopted the “Report on the Review of the Operations of SADC
169
Institutions,” which aimed to reform the SADC institutional infrastructure.
Conspicuously, however, the principle has not been elevated to legally binding
treaty status as part of any of the subsequent amendments of the SADC
170
Treaty. The report noted that the pursuit of the SADC’s “common agenda”
should be guided by several principles, including subsidiarity. Subsidiarity is
defined in the report as a principle according to which
all programmes and activities should be undertaken at levels where they can best be
handled based on consultations between governments and relevant stakeholders. The
involvement of institutions, authorities, and agencies outside SADC structures to
initiate and implement regional programmes using their own generated resources
171
should be promoted and encouraged.

Several aspects of this definition are worth noting. First, the principle
appears to be operating not between the SADC as the regional actor and
national governments but, instead, between national governments and
“relevant stakeholders” located at different levels. Second, the criterion for
determining what is the best actor and level for exercising competence is not
specified ex ante but is instead made subject to subsequent “consultations.”
Third, the definition speaks somewhat obliquely of “programmes and activities”
to be undertaken at the appropriate level, not of lawmaking or policymaking,
suggesting that the principle, as in the ECOWAS Development Program
172
discussed above, applies to the implementation, rather than to the making, of
173
law and policy. Finally, the reference to the promotion and encouragement of
166. Id. arts. 14 & 15.
167. Id. art. 16(5); see also Protocol on Tribunal and Rules of Procedure Thereof, Aug. 7, 2000,
http://www.sadc.int/files/1413/5292/8369/Protocol_on_the_Tribunal_and_Rules_thereof2000.pdf
[hereinafter Protocol on Tribunal].
168. See Communiqué of the Extra-Ordinary Summit of Heads of State and Government of the
SADC, held in Windhoek, Namibia, March 9, 2001, in SADC Head of State and Government Summit
Communiques 1980- 2006, at 123, 124, http://www.sadc.int/files/3913/5292/8384/SADC_SUMMIT
_COMMUNIQUES_1980-2006.pdf (noting unanimous adoption of Report on the Review of the
Operations of SADC Institutions).
169. Report on the Review of the Operations of SADC Institutions (Apr. 2001),
http://www.sadc.int/files/6113/5281/6304/REPORT_ON_THE_REVIEW_OF_OPERATIONS.pdf
[hereinafter Report on Review of Operations].
170. See SADC Treaty (as amended), supra note 159.
171. Report on Review of Operations, supra note 169, at 7.
172. See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
173. See, e.g., SADC Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (Mar. 1, 2001), 83–84 & 88,
http://www.sadc.int/files/5713/5292/8372/Regional_Indicative_Strategic_Development_Plan.pdf
(including subsidiarity as a “principle for RSDIP implementation” in the chapter on implementation
and coordination mechanisms).
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the involvement of actors “outside SADC structures” indicates that the
operation of subsidiarity as here understood is not strictly institutionally
bounded.
Elsewhere the notion of stakeholders is made more specific. Explanatory
notes to the report describe subsidiarity as a principle that aims to “facilitate”
the participation of stakeholders in the “furtherance of SADC’s Common
Agenda” and says that such stakeholders can be “associate organizations”;
“SADC agencies and institutions”; “political, social, cultural and economic
174
institutions and agencies”; and “NGOs and civil society.”
By giving
subsidiarity a facilitative function in bringing in both governmental and
nongovernmental actors at various levels of political organization, the more
limited understanding that subsidiarity has in the European context as a
switching device between different levels of politico–legal competence in
multilevel governance systems is being diluted. Instead, in the SADC,
subsidiarity appears as a principle that seeks to regulate the circumstances in
which action in pursuit of SADC’s objectives may be delegated or assigned,
presumably by the governments of the member states, to actors that appear
appropriately qualified for that purpose, without ex ante criteria for determining
the type of actor and at what level of governance the actor needs to be situated.
The usefulness or desirability of supportive action, rather than a rebuttable
presumption for a particular level as such, seems to be at the core of this
understanding. The fact, for example, that the creation of the SADC
Development Finance Resource Center (SADC–DFRC)—an institution
supporting national development finance institutions (DFIs) through research,
175
advice, and other types of assistance —is described as having been
176
“established under the Principle of Subsidiarity” appears to buttress this
177
interpretation: The creation of the Center neither expressly resulted from a
conflict between overlapping competences nor created a need to regulate the
exercise of its competences vis-à-vis the national DFIs due to the DFRC’s lack
of executive or legislative powers.
Last, but not least, it is noteworthy that, in contrast to the SADC Tribunal’s
two subregional sister institutions discussed above, the exercise of its
jurisdiction is subject to an exhaustion of domestic remedies requirement and
178
thus sequential subsidiarity. Although it lacks “a clear competence in the area

174. Report on Review of Operations, supra note 169, at 47–48.
175. For information on the DFRC, see the institution’s website at SADC-DFRC, http://www.sadcdfrc.org/ (last visited Apr. 7, 2016).
176. Subsidiarity, SADC-DFRC, http://www.sadc-dfrc.org/subsidiarity (last visited Apr. 7, 2016).
177. SADC–DFRC had its origins in an initiative by national DFIs, rather than by the SADC
Summit or Council of Ministers. See History, SADC-DFRC, http://www.sadc-dfrc.org/history (last
visited Apr. 7, 2016). It was subsequently recognized as a formal SADC institution. See Protocol on
Finance and Investment annex 9 art. 8, Aug. 18, 2006, http://www.sadc.int/files/4213/5332/6872/Protocol
_on_Finance__Investment2006.pdf.
178. Protocol on Tribunal, supra note 167, art. 15(2).
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of human rights,” the Tribunal has, like the EACJ, claimed and construed
jurisdiction over human rights issues on the basis of a general commitment to
180
“human rights, democracy and the rule of law” in the SADC Treaty over
181
The
whose interpretation and application it does possess jurisdiction.
Tribunal’s first foray into human rights prompted an immediate political
182
backlash that resulted in its factual demise. The trigger for that reaction was
183
the ruling in the Campbell case: the Tribunal held that the land expropriation
and redistribution policies pursued by Zimbabwe, which were entrenched by
constitutional amendment, constituted a form of racial discrimination because
expropriations were targeted virtually exclusively at white farmers. In addition,
it found that the removal of domestic courts’ jurisdiction over claims contesting
184
any such actions violated the right of access to a court and to a fair hearing.
Zimbabwe, however, viewed the decision as an “intolerable interference in the
185
country’s domestic affairs.” Not only did Zimbabwe not comply with the
judgment—even its High Court refused enforcement on the ground that the
186
judgment conflicted with weightier considerations of domestic public policy —
it managed to generate support among SADC members to effectively suspend
the Tribunal and to replace it with a new body, not yet created, that will be
187
competent to hear only disputes between states.
The decision to redefine the SADC Tribunal’s jurisdiction is an exercise of
the allocative function of subsidiarity, making the presumption for local
competence in both human rights matters and with respect to individual
complaints permanent and no longer subject to rebuttal. This decision also
shows, however, that the criteria for reallocating competences to another level
need not necessarily be normatively appealing or benign.
V
CONCLUSION
This article has examined the role of subsidiarity in select regional
integration regimes in Latin America and Africa by formal reference to the
179. Solomon Ebobrah, Litigating Human Rights Before Sub-Regional Courts in Africa: Prospects
and Challenges, 17 AFR. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 79, 84 (2009).
180. SADC Treaty (as amended), supra note 159, art. 4(c).
181. Protocol on Tribunal, supra note 167, art. 14(a).
182. See generally Alter, Gathii & Helfer, supra note 129, at 23–28 (discussing the political
repercussions of the controversial Campbell case that resulted in the tribunal’s suspension).
183. See Mike Campbell (Pvt) Ltd. & Others v. Republic of Zimbabwe, SADC (T) case no. 2/2007,
Nov. 28, 2008.
184. Id.
185. Laurie Nathan, The Disbanding of the SADC Tribunal: A Cautionary Tale, 35 HUM. RTS. Q.
870, 876 (2013).
186. GATHII, supra note 94, at 296.
187. See generally Gerhard Erasmus, The New Protocol of the SADC Tribunal: Jurisdictional
Changes and Implications for SADC Community Law (Trade Law Centre Working Paper No.
US15WP01/2015, 2015), http://www.tralac.org/images/docs/6900/us15wp012015-erasmus-new-protocolsadc-tribunal-20150123-fin.pdf.
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principle in their constitutive treaties and other official documents and
decisions. Such analysis is necessarily only a first step in assessing the spread
and use of the principle of subsidiarity and needs to be complemented with
additional research on formal and informal practices of giving effect to
considerations of subsidiarity. Even without a more comprehensive picture,
however, a few conclusions may be offered.
First, of the hypothesized relationships concerning supply and demand of
subsidiarity that underpin the conjectures examined here, none holds across all
cases. As the example of the Andean Community illustrates, the establishment
of nominally multilevel governance system with pooled sovereignty or
delegated authority does not necessarily lead to the stipulation of a subsidiarity
principle. Likewise, the different regimes’ courts, which should have been the
most likely candidates for stipulations of subsidiarity, especially with respect to
their human rights jurisdiction, have not adopted anything akin to a margin-ofappreciation doctrine in their jurisprudence to date, and ECOWAS and the
EAC omit even the most common subsidiarity requirement with respect to the
admissibility of individual complaints at the international level: the exhaustion
of domestic remedies. Considerations of subsidiarity have played a role, if any,
only to the extent that the backlashes against the African courts have sought to
repatriate certain competences fully to the member states. The analysis in part
supports other scholars’ arguments that expectations and conclusions on the
basis of comparing institutional blueprints will often be misleading—here with
respect to the need for, and utility of, a principle of subsidiarity—simply
because replicated institutional designs are frequently not intended or expected
to operate the same way as they did, or do, in the contexts from which they
188
were borrowed.
Second, where the principle of subsidiarity has been expressly defined, such
as in the institutional contexts of Latin America and Africa, its meaning
deviates from that in use in the European context. In particular, the specific
application to instances of nonexclusive, overlapping competences has largely
been replaced with a more general consideration of the comparative advantages
of various types of actors, regardless of level and even their public or private
character, in the implementation—not the articulation—of community policies.
Third, this deviation provides further evidence of the fact that although several
of the organizations canvassed in this article have been inspired by, and have
borrowed from, the EU model, such transplants rarely employ “wholesale
189
copying of EU institutional arrangements.” Nor are these definitional
differences examples of what Amitav Acharya has called “norm subsidiarity,”
which he defines as a “process whereby local actors create rules with a view to
188. See generally Babatunde Fagbayibo, Common Problems Affecting Supranational Attempts in
Africa: An Analytical Overview, 16 POTCHEFSTROOM ELECTR. L. J. 32 (2013) (discussing the attempts
to create supranational organizations in Africa and the challenges that these organizations have faced
over time).
189. Tobias Lenz, Spurred Emulation: The EU and Regional Integration in Mercosur and SADC, 35
W. EUR. POL. 155, 156 (2012).
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preserve their autonomy from dominance, neglect, violation, or abuse by more
190
powerful central actors.” The alternative approaches to subsidiarity identified
here, after all, do not relate to the relationship between the regional regimes
and other, more powerful actors, but they instead address mainly intraregime
matters.
In conclusion, then, rather than being a standardized European export that
fits and benefits all multilevel regional governance systems alike, both the
nonuse and the redefinition of subsidiarity in the institutional settings examined
in this article suggest that its utility and meaning are very much conditioned by
local needs and preferences. Future research must further examine these needs
and preferences to explain the role, or absence thereof, of the subsidiarity
principle in regional integration arrangements outside of Europe.

190. Amitav Acharya, Norm Subsidiarity and Regional Orders: Sovereignty, Regionalism, and RuleMaking in the Third World, 55 INT’L STUD. Q. 95, 96 (2011).

